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A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY:
SURVIVORSHIP UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action when
state officials violate a citizen's federal rights, but it is silent on most
issues substantially affecting federal civil rights litigation.1 For ex-
ample, § 1983 fails to address whether damages are available in sur-
2vival actions. A survival statute dictates what types of damages are
available and who may act as the representative when the original
plaintiff dies prior to receiving a final judgment. Survival actions
are often confused with wrongful death actions. In a wrongful death
action, the plaintiffs seek compensation for the losses they suffered
as a result of the decedent's death.4 Conversely, in a survival action,
a plaintiff sues to recover compensation for the decedent's injuries.
5
Currently, state and federal courts borrow the survival statute of
the state in which the court sits, unless that law is inconsistent with
the policies of compensation and deterrence which underlie § 1983.6
This has led to inconsistent and inequitable recoveries throughout the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
2. See id.
3. See Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60
IND. L.J. 559, 575 (1985).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Linzie v. City of Columbia, 651 F. Supp. 740, 742 (W.D. Mo.
1986); Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177, 182, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
580, 583 (1996).
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United States.7 Therefore, courts need to create a uniform rule of
survivorship to ensure fairness and equity.
Part I of this comment provides a brief background on § 1983. It
also discusses § 1988,8 which is used to justify the application of
state law to § 1983 survival actions.9 Lastly, Part I examines the
United States Supreme Court holding in Robertson v. Wegmann
which created the framework for applying state survival statutes.10
Part II asserts that the federal judiciary has created uniform federal
rules for many issues similar to survival damages, despite § 1988's
apparent mandate to borrow state law. It also explores the courts'
treatment of § 1983 where a violation of constitutional rights results
in death. Part Ill argues that a federal rule is preferable to state laws
which often fail to advance the policies underlying § 1983. Finally,
Part IV shows the benefits of a uniform federal rule, including con-
sistency throughout the country and fair and equitable recoveries.
I. § 1983, § 1988 & SURVIVAL ACTIONS
Congress originally enacted § 1983 during the post-Civil War
Reconstruction era as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11 Al-
though established in the 1860's, § 1983 claims were not widely
brought until the civil rights movement of the 1960's.12 In Monroe v.
Pape, the Supreme Court empowered § 1983 litigation by holding
that all state officials acting with authority of the state thereby acted
under the color of state law, regardless of whether the conduct itself
violated state procedures or rules. 13 In this case, the plaintiff sued
Chicago police officers for violating his right to be free from
7. Compare Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 94 (Idaho 1990)
(holding Idaho's survival law barring the recovery of pain and suffering dam-
ages was not inconsistent with federal law), with Williams v. City of Oakland,
915 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding California's survival law
barring pain and suffering damages was inconsistent with federal law).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
9. See Steinglass, supra note 3, at 613.
10. 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
11. See Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally
Mandated Approach to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REV. 665,
665 (1986).
12. See Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The
Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 499 (1980).
13. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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unreasonable searches and seizures. 14  Since Monroe, § 1983 has
been a major tool in advancing civil rights.15 However, because §
1983 litigation is a relatively new 6Phenomenon, courts are still de-
veloping an operative body of law.
Courts frequently look to § 1988, and consequently, to state
law to develop such a body of law.' 8 Section 1988 was enacted in
1871, shortly after § 1983.19 The United States Supreme Court inter-
preted § 1988 to mandate the use of state law to fill gaps in § 1983
where state law is not inconsistent with the policies of § 1983.20
Nonetheless, courts vary wildly in deciding when to apply state
law.
21
A. Robertson v. Wegmann 22
The Robertson decision set the stage for the application of state
law to survival actions under § 1983.23 In Robertson the United
States Supreme Court decided, for the first time, whether state law
should apply in pure survival suits without a concurrent wrongful
14. Id. at 169-70.
15. See Steinglass, supra note 3, at 563.
16. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 670.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides, in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts ... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws
of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to fumish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
.. is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
18. See, e.g., Bowling v. Oldham, 753 F. Supp. 588, 590 (M.D.N.C. 1990);
Hoffman v. McNamara, 688 F. Supp. 830, 834 (D. Conn. 1988).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 667.
20. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1980);
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
21. See infra notes 117-71 and accompanying text.
22. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
23. See id.
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death action.24 In doing so, the Court laid down the framework for
determining when state laws apply in § 1983 survival actions.2 5
In Robertson, Clay Shaw filed a § 1983 action alleging that
Louisiana attempted in bad faith to prosecute him for conspiring to
assassinate President Kennedy.26 Shaw's trial was set for November
1974, but he died in August 1974 from causes wholly unrelated to
the alleged misconduct.2  Edward F. Wegmann, the executor of
Shaw's estate, sought to substitute himself as plaintiff, and the de-
fendants moved for a dismissal claiming that Shaw's action abated
upon his death.28
At the time of Robertson, Louisiana's survival statute provided
that actions "survive only in favor of a spouse, children, parents or
siblings."29 Shaw had no such surviving relatives.3 ° The District
Court declined to apply state law.3 1 It found Louisiana's survival
statute inconsistent with federal law because the state law would
completely abate Shaw's claim, as he had no living relatives with the
requisite relationship. 32 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the ruling of the District Court on an interlocutory ap-
peal.33 The Fifth Circuit agreed that Louisiana's survivorship provi-
sion was inconsistent with federal law because it would abate the
entire claim.
34
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
lower courts wrongly determined that Louisiana's survivorship pro-
vision was inconsistent with federal law.35 The Court "rejected a
plaintiff-oriented approach to § 1988 under which courts would re-
ject otherwise applicable state policies whenever they caused a
24. See Steinglass, supra note 3, at 591.
25. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590-94.
26. Id. at 586.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 586-87.
29. Id. at 587.
30. See id.
31. See Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1368 (E.D. La. 1975).
32. See id. at 1365.
33. See Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 987 (5th Cir. 1977).
34. See id. at 984.
35. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588.
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plaintiff to lose. 36 Rather, the Court attempted to provide a frame-
work for determining when to apply state law. Accordingly, the
Court held that state laws should not apply to § 1983 actions when
inconsistent with the two policies underlying § 1983: "compensation
of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of
abuses of power by those acting under color of state law."37 The
Court further held that Louisiana's survival statute was not inconsis-
tent with these policies because:
[t]he goal of compensating those injured by a depriva-
tion of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation
of one who is merely suing as the executor of the de-
ceased's estate. And, given that most Louisiana actions
survive the plaintiffs death, the fact that a particular action
might abate surely would not adversely affect § 1983's role
in preventing official illegality.38
In reversing the lower courts, the majority made clear that its
holding was a very narrow one.39 The majority stated a different re-
sult might have been appropriate if no tort actions survived under
state law or if the state law "significantly restricted the types of ac-
tions that survive."40 Furthermore, the majority expressed that it
"intimate[d] no view ... about whether abatement based on state law
could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights
caused death.",
41
Moreover, the majority expressly rejected the idea of creating a
federal rule of absolute survivorship.42 The Court stated that, "we
can find nothing in [§ 1983] or its underlying policies to indicate that
a state law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably
36. Steinglass, supra note 3, at 592; see also Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593
("A state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely
because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the §
1983 action were the only benchmark... the appropriate rule would then al-
ways be the one favoring the plaintiff ...
37. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590-91.
38. Id. at 592.
39. See id. at 594.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 590.
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be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship."43 The Court
further declared that if Congress has not adopted a policy of uni-
formity then the Court should not create one.
44
However, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices White and Bren-
nan, argued in dissent that the Court should have used federal laws to
fashion a uniform rule, rather than apply state law.45 The dissent as-
serted that "[a] flexible reading of § 1988, permitting resort to a fed-
eral rule of survival . . . 'better serves' the policies of [§ 1983]. "46
The dissent further argued that a uniform federal rule would provide
consistency and clear answers as to which actions survive and which
abate.47
The dissent's argument for consistency and clarity in § 1983
survival actions is even more persuasive now than it was twenty
years ago. Recovery under § 1983 greatly varies depending on the
jurisdiction in which the suit is brought, despite the majority's at-
tempt to provide guidance in defining "inconsistent."
48
B. A Strict Reading of§ 1988 Undermines the
Effectiveness of§ 1983
The language of § 1988 appears to mandate the application of
state law whenever § 1983 is silent.49 But the language of § 1983 is
so vague that a strict reading of § 1988 would render § 1983 ineffec-
tive in protecting federal civil rights. For example, § 1983 does not
provide for any remedies, yet "[a] right would have little value with-
out an appropriate remedy for its violation." 50 Consequently, to give
maximum effect to § 1983, the courts must have enough latitude to
advance federal civil rights goals through uniform rules establishing
effective remedies, such as survivorship provisions. A strict reading
43. Id.
44. See id. at593-94&n.11.
45. See id. at 595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Steinglass, supra note
3, at 593 ("Justice Blackmun... argued that § 1983 required a federal policy
as the rule, not the exception.").
46. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 597 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. See infra notes 117-71 and accompanying text.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
50. Linda L. House, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEv.
ST. L. REv. 101,120 (1992).
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of § 1988 prevents such latitude, requiring courts to apply state laws
which may do nothing to advance the policies of the federal civil
rights laws.
Opponents of a federal rule of survivorship in § 1983 actions ar-
gue that if Congress wants uniformity, it has the ability to create such
a rule.51 In fact, Congress created federal survivorship provisions in
numerous statutes, but not in § 1983.52 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has held that, "'[it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely.' ' ' 53  Accordingly, because Congress
failed to create a federal rule of survivorship, the courts should as-
sume that Congress intended for state laws to govern.
However, Congress has been extremely reluctant to develop §
1983 litigation.5 4 Moreover, if Congress wants state law to apply, it
as the power to compel the courts to do so. The judiciary has created
uniform federal rules for damages, immunities, and more.5 5  Yet
Congress has refused to reverse any judicial modifications in § 1983
litigation. Congress could easily end that discretion if it felt the
courts had too much undisturbed latitude to alter federal civil rights
laws. Because Congress has not reversed judicial developments in §
1983 litigation, there is no evidence that Congress objects to the
courts establishing uniform federal rules that advance the goals of
federal civil rights laws.
51. See Brief for Respondent at *21, Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 118 S. Ct.
481 (1997) (No. 96-957), available in 1997 WL 401190.
52. See, e.g., Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1986) ("Every
common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suf-
fering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in
case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for
the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee.
... "); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) ("In any case wherein
death was caused... the United States shall be liable for actual or compensa-
tory damages .... ).
53. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338
(1994) (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)) (re-
ferring to a general principle of statutory interpretation and not a principle spe-
cifically designed for § 1983).
54. See Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Spe-
cial Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 92-94 (1989).
55. See infra notes 58-99 and accompanying text.
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A strict reading of § 1988 severely curtails the effectiveness of §
1983, as the courts would be unable to guarantee effective remedies.
Furthermore, Congress had the power when it enacted § 1983, and
has the power now, to compel the application of state laws in the §
1983 arena, but it has declined to do so. As a result, courts should
develop a uniform federal rule of survivorship that effectively pro-
motes § 1983's underlying goals of compensation and deterrence.
II. FASHIONING A UNIFORM FEDERAL RULE
Courts have sometimes borrowed state laws to fill gaps in §
1983.56 At other times courts have created federal rules.57 This sec-
tion discusses when and where courts have fashioned federal reme-
dies rather than borrowed state law. Furthermore, this section ana-
lyzes how the courts have handled survival actions under § 1983
where the victim died from unconstitutional conduct.
A. Courts Have Generally Applied Uniform Federal Rules for
Other § 1983 Damages Issues
The language of § 1983 does nothing more than grant a federal
cause of action to those deprived of their civil rights by state offi-
cials.58 Consequently, § 1983 is deficient in practically all substan-
tive areas.59 However, the Supreme Court has not borrowed state
law to fill many gaps in § 1983 litigation, although § 1988 seems to
mandate applying state law.60  In fact, "[tihe Supreme Court has
looked to section 1988 for guidance only in the areas of statutes of
limitations and survival of actions." 61 Furthermore, the Supreme
56. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980)
(statute of limitations); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)
(survival statute).
57. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271
(1981) (punitive damages against municipalities); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
58. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some
Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 601, 603 (1985).
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 271 (punitive damages are not
available against municipalities); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 55 (1983) (pu-
nitive damages are available against individual defendants).
61. Kreimer, supra note 58, at 604.
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Court has failed to clearly articulate when lower courts should rely
on § 1988.62 "This lack of clarity as to choice of law rules has lead
[sic] to scholars describing the Supreme Court's approach as ad
hoc."
63
The Supreme Court has generally declined to look to § 1988 for
remedies and has chosen instead to create uniform rules.
64 In Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, the Court stated that, "the existence of a
statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate
remedies." 5 There, the Court fashioned a federal remedy against a
corporation maintaining a public park in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1982 for refusing to admit African-Americans. 66 The Court felt the
need to create a federal rule of damages to better remedy the impair-
ment of federal rights.67 State law provided for monetary damages,
but did not permit injunctive relief. 8 The Court bypassed state law
by reading § 1988 to allow, "both federal and state rules on damages
[to] be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the
federal statutes." 69 From there, the Court reversed the lower court
holding which denied injunctive relief.
70
In Carey v. Piphus, the Court again declined to borrow state law
as § 1988 would seem to compel.71 In this case, two high school stu-
dents sued a school district under § 1983 alleging they were deprived
due process rights because they were suspended from school without
a proper hearing.72 The Court did not even consider analogous state
law.73 Rather, the Court decided that the plaintiffs could only re-
cover damages for actual injuries, and not for the value of the
62. See House, supra note 50, at 118.
63. Id. at 119.
64. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
65. 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969).
66. See id. at 234. Section 1982 guarantees all citizens shall have equal
property rights and applies to private parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
Section 1982 is also supplemented by § 1988. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 239-
40.
67. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 240.
68. See id. at 235.
69. Id. at 240.
70. See id.
71. 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978).
72. See id. at 248.
73. See id. at 264-67.
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constitutional right impaired. 74 The Court held that, "to further the
purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation.., should be
tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in ques-
tion."
75
Moreover, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., the Court
added to the development of a federal body of law in § 1983 actions
holding that punitive damages are not available against municipali-
ties, regardless of state law provisions.76 The Court did not borrow
state law, but rather fashioned a uniform rule precluding recovery of
punitive damages despite the fact that § 1983 is silent on the issue.
7 7
Instead of state law, the Court looked to Congressional intent and
public policy. 78 The Court felt that the deterrent value of punitive
damages did not justify the increased burdens on the citizens of the
offending municipality.79
Elsewhere, the Court did adopt a uniform rule allowing courts to
assess punitive damages against offending officials in their individual
capacity. 80 In Smith v. Wade, the Court held that punitive damages
are available if conduct "involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others," as well as when it is moti-
vated by evil motive or intent.81 As in City of Newport, the Court
made no attempt to determine whether state law was inconsistent
with the policies of § 1983.82 Accordingly, the aforementioned cases
demonstrate the Court's ability and willingness to overlook § 1988
and corresponding state laws in order to fashion a federal remedy that
better protects the goals of § 1983. The Court did not consider
whether state law would defeat the goals of § 1983. Rather, the
Court looked at whether a uniform rule best advances those goals.
In addition to survival actions, the only other area in which the
Supreme Court has borrowed state law is for statutes of limitations.8 3
74. See id. at 264.
75. Id. at 258-59.
76. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 265-71.
79. See id. at 268.
80. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983).
81. Id. at 56.
82. See id.
83. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980); see also,
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In Tomanio, the Court applied New York's statute of limitations and
rules for tolling the statute of limitations.84 The Court held that be-
cause Congress neglected to establish a statute of limitations or a
body of tolling rules applicable to § 1983 actions, analogous state
statutes of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules are binding.
85
The Court's approach to § 1988 with respect to statutes of limita-
tions, however, is inconsistent with the way the Court has dealt with
damages issues under § 1983.86
Does the availability of survival damages more closely resemble
statutes of limitations or availability of remedies? Statutes of limita-
tions and corresponding tolling rules simply attempt to provide final-
ity to causes of action.87 They are not intended to give effect or sub-
stance to federally protected rights.88 In fact, there is no reason to
believe that a four-year statute of limitations would more effectively
promote the goals of § 1983 than a three-year statute. Quite simply,
a reasonable statute of limitations does not directly affect a plaintiff's
substantive rights.
89
Conversely, "damages are directly related to substantive rights.
They are closely tied to the substance of § 1983 in that they define
the nature and scope of one type of available remedy." 90 The Su-
preme Court created federal rules for damages, presumably because
the availability of proper relief is crucial to make the civil rights stat-
utes effective.91 That same need exists in survival actions. Applying
a federal rule of damages when the victim is dead would make §
1983 just as effective as when the victim is alive. Limited damages
e.g., Coleman, supra note 11, at 712. ("[T]he cases in which the Court has re-
ferred to section 1988 have typically involved rather narrow questions, such as
the applicable statute of limitations .... ."). But see Burnett v. Grattan, 468
U.S. 42, 54-55 (1984) (holding Maryland statute of limitations requiring prior
administrative proceedings be exhausted was inconsistent with § 1983 because
the federal statute provided for an independent remedy).
84. 446 U.S. at 480.
85. See id. at 483-86.
86. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 719.
87. See Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487.
88. See House, supra note 50, at 119.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 120.
91. See id.
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awards in survival actions suggest that once a victim dies, the need to
effectively protect federal civil rights is not nearly as compelling.
B. Carlson v. Green 92 and a Uniform Rule of Survivorship
The Supreme Court has created a uniform rule of survivorship
where a federal official wrongfully kills.93 The reasoning behind this
rule logically extends to state officials who wrongfully kill, as well as
to state officials whose misdeeds do not result in death.
In Carlson, the Court dealt with a Bivens action, and not §
1983.94 The decedent's estate sued federal prison officials for vio-
lating the decedent's Eighth Amendment rights.95 The defendants
allegedly failed to provide the decedent with competent medical
care. 96 Indiana law abated personal injury claims where misconduct
resulted in death; however, the state did permit significant recovery
under a wrongful death action.97  The Supreme Court, not con-
strained by § 1988, as the action was not brought under § 1983,
looked to federal common law to fashion an appropriate remedy.98
The Court agreed with the respondent's contention that "only a uni-
form federal rule of survivorship is compatible with the goal of deter-
ring federal officials from infringing federal constitutional rights." 99
Although Carlson dealt with constitutional deprivations by fed-
eral officials, many courts have extended the rule laid down in Carl-
son to § 1983 actions where state officials deprived citizens of their
federal rights. 00 For example, in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, the Sev-
enth Circuit refused to apply Wisconsin's survival laws where the
92. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 18. A Bivens action is brought where a federal official, under
color of law, violates a citizen's constitutional right. See Steinglass, supra
note 3, at 596. The cause of action for a Bivens action is implicitly provided
by the United States Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
95. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
96. See id. at l6 n.1.
97. See id. at 17.
98. See id. at 23-24.
99. Id. at 23.
100. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1238 (7th Cir.
1984); O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp.
1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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decedent died as a result of unconstitutional conduct.101 There, a
Milwaukee police officer fatally shot Daniel Bell; Bell's father pur-
sued a § 1983 survival action.'0 2 State law barred the survival of loss
of life damages. 10 3 The court cited Carlson in ignoring the more re-
strictive state law, holding that "Supreme Court precedent... indi-
cate[s] that allowing the estate of Daniel Bell to recover is the proper
result under federal policy."'1 4 Consequently, the court upheld a
$100,000 award for Daniel Bell's loss of life. 10 5
Similarly, an Alabama district court relied on Carlson in apply-
ing a federal remedy over the state law precluding compensatory
damages. 0 6 In Weeks v. Benton, the estate of a deceased prisoner
brought a § 1983 action against county officials who failed to provide
him with adequate medical care.107 The court relied on Carlson to
justify applying a federal remedy in favor of state law.'0 8 The court
stated that "even though the Carlson Court's decision was not con-
trolled by § 1988, many of the policy reasons for declining to apply
state survival law in Bivens actions are also applicable by analogy to
§ 1983 actions."'
10 9
Conversely, the Alabama Supreme Court ignored Carlson and
applied Alabama's survival statute in a § 1983 action where the vic-
tim died when city firefighters allegedly refused to save the decedent
from her burning home. 110 Presumably as a result of the split be-
tween state and federal courts in Alabama, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in City of Tarrant in order to decide
"[w]hether, when a decedent's death is alleged to have resulted from
a deprivation of federal rights occurring in Alabama, the Alabama
Wrongful Death Act, Section 6-5-410 (Ala. 1975) governs the recov-
ery by the representative of the decedent's estate under 42 U.S.C.
101. 746 F.2d at 1238.
102. See id. at 1214-22.
103. See id. at 1235.
104. Id. at 1238.
105. See id. at 1240.
106. See Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
107. See id. at 1298.
108. See id. at 1308.
109. Id. at 1309.
110. See City of Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29, 31 (Ala. 1996).
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Section 1983.""' The Court did not decide the case on the merits
because the ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court was not a final
judgment.112 However, by granting certiorari in the first place, the
Supreme Court indicated its willingness to consider whether a uni-
form federal rule of survivorship is necessary to advance the goals of
§ 1983 where the misconduct results in death.
III. SEVERAL CURRENT STATE LAW LIMITATIONS DEFEAT THE
POLICIES UNDERLYING § 1983
This section examines why a federal rule of survivorship is nec-
essary in pure survival actions. Current state law limitations on re-
covery in survival actions fail to promote the primary goals of the
federal statutes. This section also deals with the common arguments
asserted by proponents of state law limitations, particularly the as-
sertion that state survival statutes are never inconsistent with the
policies underlying § 1983.
A. Current Limitations on § 1983 Survival Damages Are
Inconsistent with the Underlying Goal of Compensation
In Robertson v. Wegmann, the United States Supreme Court at-
tempted to provide a useful definition of "inconsistent" when deter-
mining the applicability of state survival statutes. 113 According to
the Court, "[a] state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with
federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the
litigation."' 1 4 However, the Court asserted its decision was "a nar-
row one," and that a state survival statute may be inconsistent with §
1983 where a state law has an "independent adverse effect on the
policies underlying § 1983."'l 15 Furthermore, a state statute could be
inconsistent if it "did not provide for survival of any tort actions, or if
it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive."
116
Since Robertson, state and federal courts are in considerable dis-
array in determining whether a state statute is inconsistent with the
111. Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 117 S. Ct. 1333, 1333 (1997).
112. See Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 118 S. Ct. 481, 483-84 (1997).
113. See 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978).
114. Id. at 593.
115. Id. at594.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
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policies underlying § 1983. For example, in Larson v. Wind, a fed-
eral district court held that barring the survival of a § 1983 action
when misconduct does not result in death was inconsistent with the
goals of § 1983.17 There, Larson brought a § 1983 action alleging
police officers wrongfully shot him in violation of his civil rights.
118
He later died from causes unrelated to the claim. 119 The court con-
strued the Illinois Survival Act to permit the survival of Larson's
claim, but the court held Larson's claim would have survived re-
gardless because "[iut would clearly disserve the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act-causing an 'independent adverse effect on the
policies underlying § 1983'-to permit the fact of Larson's later
death to change the result."
1 20
On the other hand, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho's
survival statute, which abates all claims upon the death of the plain-
tiff, was not inconsistent with § 1983.11 There, the plaintiff filed a §
1983 action against law enforcement officers for violating her Fourth
Amendment rights. 122 Ms. Evans alleged that sheriff deputies as-
saulted her.123 She later died from causes unrelated to the claim.
12 4
But, Idaho did not provide for the survival of personal injury
claims. 125 In finding Idaho law consistent with § 1983, the court
held, "[t]he application of Idaho common law non-survivability rule
is presumably the same as the federal common law rule and is not in-
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
126
Apparently, the court felt the federal common law was identical to
the general common law which barred all survival actions.' 2 7 Ac-
cording to the logic of the court, however, no survival action could
be inconsistent with federal law because no law can be more restric-
tive than an absolute ban on survival actions.
117. 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
118. See id. at 26.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 27.
121. See Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 94 (Idaho 1990).
122. See id. at 88.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 91.
126. Id. at 94.
127. See id.
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Despite the split among courts, failing to provide for significant
damage awards is inconsistent with the policy of compensation. For
example, in Williams v. City of Oakland, a federal district court held
that California's survival statute, which precluded the recovery of
pain and suffering damages, was inconsistent with the policy of com-
pensation.' 28 Piedad Williams filed a § 1983 suit alleging that Oak-
land police officers violated her Fourth Amendment protections by
using excessive force to effect an unlawful search and seizure.1
29
Williams later died from causes unrelated to the claim.' 3° The court
looked to California's survival statute, but determined it was incon-
sistent with federal law because California law barred recovery for
pain and suffering. 31 The Court held that "deny[ing] pain and suf-
fering damages would strike at the very heart of a section 1983 ac-
tion, ' 132 since it prevented significant monetary relief.
Excluding pain and suffering damages in § 1983 survival actions
is always inconsistent with the policy of compensation and can have
a particularly devastating effect in certain types of actions, such as
illegal searches and seizures and sexual harassment claims. In ac-
tions where the predominant injuries are emotional, excluding pain
and suffering damages has the practical effect of abating the entire
claim. Quite simply, if a representative cannot recover for pain and
suffering, which are the only types of injuries resulting from
a wrongful act, then the victim has no other means of relief.
128. 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1079-80 (N.D. Cal. 1996); accord Davis v. City of
Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1257 (E.D. Wash. 1987) (holding Washing-
ton's survival statute, which barred recovery of pain and suffering damages,
was inconsistent with § 1983).
129. See Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1075.
130. See id.
131. Seeid. at 1079.
In an action or proceeding by a decedent's personal representative or
successor in interest on the decedent's cause of action, the damages
recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sus-
tained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or
exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to re-
cover had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for pain,
suffering, or disfigurement.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 1992).
132. Williams, 915 F. Supp. at 1077 (quoting Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.
Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981)).
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Consequently, the victim endures the pain and suffering, but cannot
obtain any compensation for it.
In addition to state statutes excluding the recovery of pain and
suffering damages, other state law limitations similarly work to de-
feat the goal of compensation. In Jaco v. Bloechle, the Sixth Circuit
held that Ohio law, which abated the entire action if the victim dies
instantly from the illegal conduct, was inconsistent with the goal of
compensation.'33 Jaco filed a § 1983 action alleging her son's civil
rights were violated when he was shot and killed instantly by police
officers. 134 Although Ohio law would have abated the survival ac-
tion, Jaco could still maintain an action for wrongful death. 35 In
finding Ohio's survival statute inconsistent with the goal of compen-
sation, the court held that "[t]he § 1983 objective of ... providing
compensation to the victim for an illegal deprivation of constitutional
entitlements by state officers cannot be advanced, and is only under-
mined, by deferring to a state law which decrees abatement."'
136
Although numerous courts agree that substantial compensatory
damages must be available in order to be consistent with § 1983's
purpose of compensating victims of constitutional deprivations, other
courts have held that compensation is not an issue if the victim is
dead because no award can effectively compensate a dead person.
137
For example, in Garcia v. Superior Court, a state appellate court ap-
plied California's survival law precluding recovery for pain and suf-
fering damages in a § 1983 survival action where the victim died
from injuries sustained when police officers applied a choke-hold in
the course of an arrest. 138 The court concluded, "once deceased, the
decedent cannot in any practical way be compensated for his injuries
or pain and suffering, or be made whole."'
139
133. 739 F.2d 239, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1984).
134. See id. at 240.
135. See id. at 242.
136. Id. at 244.
137. See, e.g., Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293, 1305 (S.D. W. Va.
1982); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981);
Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177, 186, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586
(1996).
138. See 42 Cal. App. 4th at 180, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
139. Id. at 186, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 586. The court does note, however, that
significant compensatory damages are available to the estate under a wrongful
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Similarly, in Jones v. George, the court held that West Vir-
ginia's survival statute, which abated personal injury actions that re-
suited in death, did not defeat the goal of compensation. 4 ' The court
concluded that "compensating the victim of constitutional depriva-
tion, is not in issue as it relates to the personal injury claims, since
[the victim] is dead."' 141 Furthermore, a district court held Alabama's
survival scheme, which provides for punitive, but not compensatory
damages, was not inconsistent with the goal of compensation. 142 The
court stated, "[lt is clear that where the injured party is deceased, any
damage award would not compensate him for his injuries, because
the cruel fact is that he is no longer present to benefit from any dam-
ages awarded. No damages award could compensate him.
143
Courts believing that compensation is not an issue in survival
damages often find support from Robertson, where the Supreme
Court stated, "[t]he goal of compensating those injured by a depriva-
tion of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one
who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased's estate."'
144
However, reliance on this passage to avoid considering the effect
state survival statutes have on compensation is misplaced. In Rob-
ertson, the plaintiff was merely the executor of the estate. 145 How-
ever, in most § 1983 survival actions, the executor of the estate is
also the spouse, 146 child 147 or parent 148 of the victim whose constitu-
tional rights were violated. When the immediate family is forced to
death action. See id.
140. See Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. at 1305. The court did find the state
law was not inconsistent with the deterrent purpose of § 1983 and declined to
apply state law. See id.
141. Id.
142. See Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. at 664.
143. Id.
144. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F.
Supp. at 664; Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. at 1302.
145. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 586.
146. See, e.g., Burt v. Abel, 466 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (D.S.C. 1979); County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 360 (1996), rev.
granted, 932 P.2d 1296, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21 (1997).
147. See, e.g., City of Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29, 29 (Ala. 1996);
Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 459 (Colo. 1981).
148. See, e.g., Jaco, 739 F.2d at 239; Agresta v. Sambor, 687 F. Supp. 162,
162 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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sit back and watch their loved one suffer at the hands of state offi-
cials, the family should be entitled to compensation.
The Court also stressed that its holding in Robertson was "a nar-
row one" and should be limited to the specific situation before the
Court. 14 9 The Court held that the policy of compensation is not vio-
lated when a mere executor cannot recover under a § 1983 survival
action when the state law permitted recovery only by a spouse, par-
ent, child, or sibling of the deceased.150 Interpreting that statement to
permanently preclude consideration of the effect a state statute has on
compensation completely ignores the Court's mandate to narrowly
construe its holding. If the Court intended to absolutely ignore the
effect on compensation in determining the consistency of state sur-
vival statutes, it could have used more definitive language, such as
that in Brown v. Morgan County, which stated, "the cruel fact is that
he is no longer present to benefit from any damages awarded. No
damage award could compensate him."'151 However, the Court
elected not to do so.
Barring or substantially limiting available compensatory dam-
ages for actual injuries suffered does nothing to further compensa-
tion. On the other hand, allowing full recovery to the estate of those
whose constitutional rights have been violated actively seeks to ad-
vance the goal of compensation.
B. Current Limitations on § 1983 Survival Damages are
Inconsistent with the Underlying Goal of Deterrence
State survival statutes are also inconsistent with § 1983 when
they hinder the goal of deterring future acts of official misconduct.
152
Many courts have held that, in order to promote deterrence, signifi-
cant damages must be available against state officials who violate the
constitutional rights of others. 153 In Guyton v. Phillips, California's
survival law precluding pain and suffering damages was examined by
149. 436 U.S. at 594.
150. See id. at 592.
151. 518 F. Supp. at 664.
152. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
153. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1504 (10th Cir.
1990); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
November 1998]
240 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:221
the courts.'5 4 This case involved a § 1983 action brought by the
mother of a man wrongfully shot and killed by police officers.'
55
The court concluded that if damages available if the victim lives are
not available if the victim dies then state officials will not have a de-
terrent, but rather an incentive to kill instead of merely injuring their
victims.156 Specifically, the court stated, "[t]he inescapable conclu-
sion is that there may be substantial deterrent effect to conduct that
results in the injury of an individual but virtually no deterrent to con-
duct that kills its victim. ' 157 The court further stated that deterrence
"is hardly served when the police officer who acts without justifica-
tion suffers a harsher penalty for injuring or maiming a victim than
for killing him."' 8
Similarly, Bell v. City of Milwaukee was another § 1983 action
brought by a parent whose son was wrongfully killed by police offi-
cers. ' 9 In Bell, the court held that Wisconsin's survival statute was
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of deterrence because the
statute did not provide for recovery of loss of life damages.' 60 The
court noted, "if Section 1983 did not allow recovery for loss of life
notwithstanding inhospitable state law, deterrence would be further
subverted since it would be more advantageous to the unlawful actor
to kill rather than injure."'
161
Although Guyton and Bell dealt with situations where the unlaw-
ful conduct resulted in the death of the victim, the unavailability of
substantial damages equally undermines the goal of deterrence when
the victim died from causes unrelated to the claim. In Williams v.
City of Oakland, the court relied on Guyton in holding California's
154. See Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1164.
155. See id. at 1156.
156. See id. at 1166.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1167.
159. 746 F.2d 1205, 1214 (7th Cir. 1984).
160. Id. at 1240; accord Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that Illinois law barring survival of loss of life damages was in-
consistent with the deterrent policy underlying § 1983); Linzie v. City of Co-
lumbia, 651 F. Supp. 740, 742 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding Missouri's ban on
the survival of loss of life damages thwarted the goal of deterrence).
161. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239.
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survival statute inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1983.162
Barring pain and suffering damages had the practical effect of abat-
ing the entire claim.' 63 The Williams court held California's survival
statute "would leave the deceased plaintiffs survivors with no rem-
edy and the violating defendants with little or no incentive to refrain
from illegal conduct."'164 Preventing recovery for a decedent's pain
and suffering has devastating effects on § 1983 suits, particularly if a
wrongful death action cannot be brought.
Where courts have determined state statutes abating large dam-
age claims are not inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1983,
the decisions often rested on the availability of significant damages
under a separate cause of action, usually for wrongful death. 165 For
example, the plaintiffs in Garcia could simultaneously maintain a
wrongful death action and a survival action because the misconduct
resulted in death. 166 Under California law, significant damages were
available under a wrongful death action, including loss of society and
future support. 167 In concluding that limitations on survival damages
were not inconsistent with § 1983, the court stated, "significant com-
pensatory damages flowing from the actor's killing of the victim [are
available], and which the actor must take into account; this provides
both compensation and deterrence."'
168
Survival actions and wrongful death actions cannot always be
viewed together. In instances where misconduct does not result in
death, wrongful death actions are unavailable. 69 Therefore, severe
limitations on survival damages defeat the goals of § 1983 when not
accompanied by a wrongful death action.170 Furthermore, wrongful
death actions and survival actions are based on separate injuries;
162. 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
163. See id. at 1079.
164. Id. at 1078.
165. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 662 (N.D. Ala.
1981); Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177, 187, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
580, 586 (1996).
166. 42 Cal. App. 4th at 186-87, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 187, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
169. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361
(1996).
170. See id. at 362.
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wrongful death actions compensate for injuries suffered by the estate,
while survival actions remedy injuries suffered by the decedent. 171
Some courts have held that the threat of litigation is sufficient to
deter future misconduct; consequently, restrictive state statutes are
not inconsistent with the § 1983 goal of deterrence. 172 For example,
in Goad v. Macon County the court borrowed Tennessee's statute
providing for a dollar-for-dollar set-off of settlement amounts from a
final judgement.173 In this case, the plaintiff settled with three defen-
dants for an amount greater than the final judgment. 174 Conse-
quently, the remaining defendants escaped all financial liability for
compensatory damages. 175 The court felt, "the possibility of com-
pensating for the entire injury still exists as a deterrent to the con-
templated act.' 76 That contention, however, should not be extended
to survival suits.
The argument that the threat of suit is a sufficient deterrent
seems to be based on a faulty reading of Robertson. The Robertson
court held Louisiana's survival statute did not significantly thwart the
goal of deterrence.' 77 It stated, "[a] state official contemplating ille-
gal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983
action being filed against him."'178 However, the Court based that
statement on the fact that "most Louisiana actions survive the plain-
tiff s death."'179 Consequently, extending the holding in Robertson to
support a universal belief that the potential of a suit is an adequate
deterrent completely ignores the Robertson Court's desire to produce
a narrow holding.
171. See Steinglass, supra note 3, at 564.
172. See Goad v. Macon County, 730 F. Supp. 1425, 1432 (M.D. Tenn.
1989).
173. See id. at 1431.
174. See id. at 1425-26.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 1431; but see Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 766 (5th Cir.
1983) (The court refused to apply a dollar-for-dollar set-off in a similar situa-
tion, holding, "[a] rule that removes the burden of damages from the wrong-
doer certainly conflicts with the policy of deterrence.").
177. 436 U.S. at 592.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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In support of its conclusion that Louisiana's survival law was
not inconsistent with the policy of deterrence, the Court stated:
In order to find even a marginal influence on behavior as a
result of Louisiana's survivorship provisions, one would
have to make the rather farfetched assumptions that a state
official had both the desire and the ability deliberately to
select as victims only those persons who would die before
conclusion of the § 1983 suit (for reasons entirely uncon-
nected with the official illegality) and who would not be
survived by any close relatives.
180
However, the implausible hypothetical laid down by the Court in
Robertson becomes far more real under a state survival statute se-
verely restricting what damages are recoverable. State officials could
be heedless of the civil rights of any person likely to die prior to the
conclusion of a § 1983 trial, regardless of whether that person will be
survived by a close relative. In fact, it was the difficulty of finding a
victim not survived by a parent, spouse, child, or sibling that made
the situation in Robertson so unlikely.
181
A survival statute that prevents significant recovery by any sur-
vivor offers little or no protection for the elderly, terminally ill, and
others unlikely to live for the several years a § 1983 suit can take.
State officials could violate these people's civil rights at will and
with very little fear of liability. If illegal conduct does not kill a vic-
tim, then no wrongful death suit is available, allowing offending offi-
cials to completely escape liability for injuries they caused. For ex-
ample, a state official who sexually harasses elderly women at a
state-operated nursing facility will go unpunished, so long as his vic-
tims die from causes unrelated to the claim prior to the conclusion of
a § 1983 suit. Since damages for sexual harassment are primarily for
pain and suffering, which many state survival statutes exclude, 82 the
perpetrator is beyond the grasp of § 1983 and has no legal incentive
to refrain from continued violations.
180. Id. at 592-93 & n.10 (emphasis added).
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West Supp. 1998); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-20-101(1) (1987).
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Lastly, restrictive state survival statutes defeat the purpose of
deterrence by providing an undeserved windfall to offending state of-
ficials. Where compensatory damages are precluded or substantially
limited in § 1983 survival actions, the wrongdoer has effectively
avoided a substantial amount of liability simply as a result of the
death of the victim. But if the victim does not die then a wrongdoer
may be liable for substantially greater compensatory damages. It is
nonsensical that state officials who deprive citizens of their federal
rights should benefit from the unintended death of the victim.
183
Significant compensatory damages are necessary to effectively
deter state officials from violating the civil rights of all citizens.
When state survival statutes substantially reduce the liability of of-
fending state officials, the underlying intent of § 1983 is thwarted, if
not completely destroyed. Furthermore, restrictive survival statutes
provide little protection for many who need it, yet provide an unde-
served windfall to the state official who acts outside the bounds of
the Constitution. Consequently, a uniform federal rule of survivor-
ship, which allows for significant economic and non-economic dam-
ages, best advances the goal of deterrence.
IV. BENEFITS OF A UNIFORM FEDERAL RULE OF SURVIVORSHIP
In Robertson v. Wegmann, the United States Supreme Court
opted against a uniform rule of survivorship and created the "incon-
sistent with federal policies" test, which is proving ineffective in
adequately protecting constitutional rights. 184 As discussed above, a
comprehensive federal rule of survivorship would more effectively
deter future constitutional violations and better ensure compensa-
tion.18 5 A uniform rule of survivorship would provide consistent re-
sults in § 1983 actions, making federal rights apply equally to citi-
zens of each state. It would also provide additional benefits, such as
certainty and discouraging forum shopping.
183. See Burt v. Abel, 466 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (D.S.C. 1979) (holding "the
sound public policy ... that the death of a party... should not provide a wind-
fall to the opposition ... is... applicable here and should support the court's
interpretation").
184. 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
185. See supra Part III.
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A. A Uniform Rule of Survivorship Would Bring
Consistency to § 1983 Actions
Although the majority in Robertson declined to adopt a uniform
federal rule of survivorship, the dissent, led by Justice Blackmun, ar-
gued in favor of a uniform rule.186 One of the major reasons the dis-
sent argued for uniformity was to provide for consistent results
throughout the country.187 In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that
if the Court adopted a uniform rule of survivorship, "[1]itigants iden-
tically aggrieved in their federal civil rights, residing in geographi-
cally adjacent States, will not have differing results due to the vaga-
ries of state law."'188 In other words, citizens of every state will enjoy
equal protection of federal rights.
Some circuits have adopted circuit-wide survivorship rules in
order tQ promote consistency. 89 For example, the Eleventh Circuit
argued that uniformity would promote consistency and provide eq-
uitable results. 190 In Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, the court opted to
create a federal rule of damages, rather than apply Georgia's recovery
scheme. 191 The court held:
applying a federal standard of damages for injuries suffered
by a decedent will promote consistency in the type and
amount of damages awarded. Were we to ... award the
damages provided in the state wrongful death statute, there
would be three separate measures of damages for the un-
constitutional deprivation of life in this circuit: the dam-
ages permitted by the wrongful death statutes of Alabama,
Florida and Georgia.
192
The Third Circuit has also supported uniformity in federal survi-
vorship rules.' 93 The court held, "[t]he Civil Rights Acts were
brought into being at a critical time in the history of the United States
186. 436 U.S. at 595-603 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734, 739-40 (1lth Cir. 1989);
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965).
190. See Gilmere, 864 F.2d at 739-40.
191. See id. at 737.
192. Id. at 739.
193. See Basista, 340 F.2d at 86.
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following the Civil War. They were intended to confer equality in
civil rights before the law in all respects for all persons embraced
within their provisions."'194 The court continued, holding that:
the benefits of the Acts were intended to be uniform
throughout the United States ... and that the amount of
damages to be recovered by the injured individual was not
to vary because of the law of the state in which the federal
court suit was brought. Federal common law must be ap-
plied to effect uniformity, otherwise the Civil Rights Acts
would fail to effect the purposes and ends which Congress
intended.1
95
Although the United States Supreme Court rejected a uniform rule of
survivorship in Robertson,196 the logic of the circuit court's holding
remains true.
By allowing state law to dictate the amount of recovery, the
courts are allowing the states to determine the scope of federal pro-
tection under § 1983 if the victim dies prior to the conclusion of the
litigation. Consistent recoveries, on the other hand, would protect
the federal rights equally for all people, regardless of what state they
were in when deprived of their civil rights. Consequently, the scope
of federal protection would be equal throughout the nation.
Residency determines the availability and scope of several im-
portant rights and protections. In many circumstances the rights and
responsibilities of citizens should depend upon residency. For ex-
ample, welfare recipients may receive larger or smaller benefits de-
pending on the state in which they receive aid.197 Also, crimes that
qualify for the death penalty in one state may only qualify for life
imprisonment in another. 198 However, the purpose of § 1983 is to
protect rights that the United States Constitution guarantees to all
citizens regardless of residency. Accordingly, equality of federal
rights is not accomplished if the protection of those rights varies
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 436 U.S. at 590.
197. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN: YEARBOOK 1997, at 98 (1997).
198. See, e.g., THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 36-38 (Hugo Adam Bedau
ed., 1997).
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greatly from state to state. Therefore, a uniform rule of survivorship
in § 1983 actions is necessary to equally protect fundamental federal
rights in every state.
B. Additional Benefits of a Uniform Rule of Survivorship
A uniform rule of survivorship would not only bring about fair
and consistent results, but would also achieve additional benefits.
For example, a uniform rule would lead to certainty and predictabil-
ity in § 1983 survival actions, which would decrease litigation over
whether to apply state or federal law. Furthermore, a uniform rule of
survivorship would also deter forum shopping.
In his dissent in Robertson, Justice Blackmun contended that a
uniform rule of survivorship would provide much needed predict-
ability to § 1983 litigation. 199 He argued that, "[1]itigants need not
engage in uncertain characterization of a § 1983 action in terms of its
nearest tort cousin, a questionable procedure to begin with. ' 200 Jus-
tice Blackmun further argued, "[a] federal rule of survivorship allows
uniformity, and counsel [to] immediately know the answer [to § 1983
survivorship issues]."20 '
The certainty which a uniform survivorship rule would provide
has many advantages. Certainty would allow attorneys to give their
clients quick and accurate answers as to the likely success of a §
1983 survival action.202 The ability to provide quick answers will
more adequately inform potential litigants of the costs and benefits of
pursuing a § 1983 action. Hypothetically, if a potential plaintiff
knew that he could not recover significant damages for the unconsti-
tutional injuries suffered by his deceased wife, then that plaintiff
would most likely avoid incurring the time and costs associated with
§ 1983 litigation.
Furthermore, certainty would reduce much, if not all, of the liti-
gation over what types of damages are available under § 1983 sur-
vival actions. Since the Supreme Court adopted the "inconsistent"
test in Robertson, the court system has been inundated with
199. 436 U.S. 584, 602 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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numerous cases debating what damages may be recovered.20 3 A uni-
form survivorship rule would end constant litigation over whether a
state law is inconsistent with federal policies.
In addition to providing certainty and promoting judicial effi-
ciency, a uniform federal rule of survivorship would also eliminate
the advantages of forum shopping. In determining whether to apply
state law in a § 1983 survival action, state and federal courts within
the same state may have completely opposite rulings. For example,
in Guyton v. Phillips, a federal court held that California's survival
statute was inconsistent with the policies underlying § 1983.2o4 On
the other hand, a California appellate court has held state law is not
inconsistent with those same policies. 20 5 Consequently, such ineq-
uitable results influence litigants to bring the action in the forum
most favorable to their position.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that forum shopping
is an undesirable result of inconsistent laws and should be
avoided.20 6 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court over-
turned a state court interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act.
2 0 7
The Court ruled in favor of consistency because it did not want to
"encourage and reward forum shopping., 20 8 A uniform rule of sur-
vivorship bests promotes the policy of discouraging forum shopping
by eliminating the benefits of choosing one forum over another.
A uniform rule of survivorship possesses many potential advan-
tages. Such a rule would bring fairness and equity to § 1983 actions
throughout the United States. Furthermore, a uniform federal rule
brings consistency to § 1983 survival actions, which decreases litiga-
tion and prevents forum shopping.
203. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal.
1996); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87 (Idaho 1990).
204. 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
205. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177, 187, 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 580, 587 (1996).
206. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
207. See id.
208. Id.
A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Robertson, § 1983 survival
litigation has been uncertain, inconsistent, and often unfair. A uni-
form federal rule of survivorship would provide certainty and con-
sistency in federal civil rights litigation and more effectively promote
the fundamental goals underlying § 1983--compensating victims of
constitutional deprivations and deterring future misconduct by state
officials.
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